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Abstract. In a multi-hop mobile ad hoc network (MANET), mobile nodes co-
operate to form a network without using any infrastructure such as access points 
or base stations. The mobility of the nodes and the fundamentally limited ca-
pacity of the wireless medium, together with wireless transmission effects such 
as attenuation, multi-path propagation, and interference combine to create sig-
nificant challenges for security in MANETs. Traditional cryptographic mecha-
nisms such as authentication and encryption are not capable of handling some 
kinds of attacks such as packet dropping by malicious nodes in MANETs. This 
paper presents a mechanism for detecting malicious packet dropping attacks in 
MANETs. The mechanism is depends on a trust module on each node, which is 
based on the reputation value computed for that node by its neighbors. The 
reputation value of a node is computed based on its packet forwarding behavior 
in the network. The reputation information is gathered, stored and exchanged 
between the nodes, and computed under different scenario. The proposed pro-
tocol has been simulated in a network simulator. The simulation results show 
the efficiency of its performance. 
Keywords: Mobile ad hoc network (MANET), trust, reputation, packet drop-
ping, node misbehavior. 
1   Introduction 
Although the security objectives of both ad hoc networks and traditional networks are 
considered the same such as availability, confidentiality, integrity, authentication, and 
non-repudiation, the security issues involved in ad hoc networks are quite different 
due to their mobile and  ad hoc constraints, i.e., limited computing and communication 
resources, dynamic network topology as well as the mobility of the nodes. In tradi-
tional networks, most trust evidences are generated via potentially lengthy assurance 
processes, distributed off-line, and assumed to be valid on a long term. In contrary, 
few of these characteristics of trust relations and trust evidences are prevalent in 
MANETs. Since the security solutions developed for the wired networks are not fit for 
scenarios, new security solutions become essential. Cryptographic primitives such as 
authentication and key distribution are the usual mechanisms used for implementing 
security in MANETs. However, these schemes cannot provide security against some 
attacks such as packet dropping attack by malicious nodes. 
There are several approaches for security in MANETs [1][2]. The significant ef-
forts done so far are mainly in the adaptation from the existing distributed trust model 
to ad hoc trust model. One approach of establishing trust among the nodes in a 
MANETs is by detecting misbehaving nodes that maliciously drop packets. These 
malicious nodes can be detected by utilizing the concept of reputation. The reputation 
of a node refers to the perception that another node has about its intention and activi-
ties. Reputation is a tool for motivating cooperation among nodes and so as to ensure 
that most of them exhibit good behavior in their activities. Each node in a network is 
assigned a reputation value as computed jointly by its neighbors. The higher the repu-
tation value of a node the more trustworthy that node is. In this paper, a reputation-
based distributed trust management scheme for MANETs is proposed. The nodes in a 
MANET collaborate to compute the reputation values of their neighbors, and identify 
the nodes for which reputation values fall below a pre-defined threshold value. The 
nodes having their reputation values below the threshold are identified as malicious. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses some of the exist-
ing trust- and reputation-based schemes for MANETs. Section 3 describes the details 
of the proposed trust mechanism. Section 4 presents the results of simulation con-
ducted on the proposed protocol. Section 5 discusses some future scope of work and 
concludes the paper.  
2   Related Work 
Different approaches exist for defining trust. Trust, in general, is a directional rela-
tionship between two entities and plays a major role in building a relationship between 
nodes in a network. Even though trust has been formalized as a computational model, 
it still means different things for different research communities such as public key 
authentication [3], electronic commerce [4], and P2P networks [5]. The reputation of 
an entity, on the other hand, has been defined as an expectation of its behavior based 
on other entities’ observations or information about the entity’s past behavior within a 
specific context at a given time [7]. In case of a MANET, the reputation of a node 
refers to how good the node is in terms of its contribution to routing activities in the 
network.   
The resurrecting duckling security protocol proposed by Stajano et al. is particu-
larly suited for devices without display and embedded devices that are too weak for 
public-key operations [8]. Eshenauer et al. have proposed a trust establishment 
mechanism for MANETs, in which a node in the network can generate trust evidence 
about any other node [9].  
Among the more recent works, Repantis et al. have proposed a decentralized trust 
management middleware for ad hoc, peer-to-peer networks based on reputation of the 
nodes [10]. In the trust-based data management scheme proposed by Patwardhan et 
al., mobile nodes access distributed information, storage and sensory resources avail-
able in pervasive computing environment [11]. Sun et al. have presented a framework 
to quantitatively measure trust, model trust propagation, and defend trust evaluation 
system against malicious attacks [12]. Chang et al have proposed a trust-based scheme 
for multicast communication in a MANET [13]. Sen et al. have proposed a self-
organized trust establishment scheme for nodes in a large-scale MANET in which a 
trust initiator is introduced during the network bootstrapping phase [14]. The authors 
have also proposed a distributed trust-based intrusion detection system for MANETs 
based on local observation and cooperation among nodes [15].   
 Cooperation Of Nodes-Fairness In Dynamic Ad-hoc NeTworks (CONFIDANT) is 
a security model for MANETs based on selective altruism and utilitarianism proposed 
by Buchegger et al. [6]. It is a distributed, symmetric reputation model that uses both 
first-hand and second-hand information for computation of reputation values. The 
proposed protocol in this paper has many similarities with the CONFIDANT protocol. 
However, the metrics for computing the reputation of a node in the proposed protocol 
are different from those used in CONFIDANT. The proposed protocol takes into 
account the historical data of the reputation of the nodes which makes the computed 
reputation values more robust. In contrast to the approach followed in CONFIDANT, 
the proposed mechanism broadcasts the reputation information to all neighbors of a 
node thereby making the protocol more reliable and fault-tolerant and hence more 
secure.  
3   Trust Manager 
Establishment of trust in a MANET requires successful detection of intruders and 
isolating them promptly so that they may not exploit any network resources. However, 
if one relies only on self-detecting misbehaviors, one may arrive at a wrong evaluation 
of trust. In fact, a node that is actually not sending any packets currently cannot detect 
selfish nodes in its neighborhood. As a consequence, collaboration between neighbor-
ing nodes becomes mandatory. In the proposed scheme, every node in the network 
monitors the behavior of its neighbors, and upon detecting any abnormal action from 
any of them, it broadcasts this information to other nodes in order to make them aware 
about its observation. The neighbors of a node A refer to all the nodes in the network 
those are one-hop distant from the node A. 
The proposed mechanism builds trust through an entity, called the trust manager 
that runs on each node in the ad hoc network (Fig. 1). The Trust Manager has two 
main components: (i) monitoring module and (ii) reputation handling module. 
3.1   The Monitoring Module 
Each node in the MANET independently monitors the packet forwarding activities of 
its neighbors. This monitoring is related to the proportion of correctly forwarded 
packets with respect to the total number of packets to be forwarded during a fixed 
time window. Based on these statistics, if an anomaly is detected, the monitor informs 
the reputation manager, which analyses the packet loss information and take appro-
priate action. This is explained in Section 3.2 
3.2   The Reputation Handling Module 
The main functionality of the trust manager is the reputation information manage-
ment. This functionality involves four major activities: (i) reputation information col-
lection, (ii) reputation information formatting, (iii) reputation information mainte-
nance, and (iv) reputation information rating. Each of these functions is described in 
detail in the following sub-sections. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. The architecture of Trust Manager 
3.2.1   Reputation information collection  
This activity is the first step in the reputation information management process. In the 
proposed mechanism, the reputation information is collected in two ways: (a) sensing 
or direct monitoring, and (b) recommendations and accusations. In sensing or direct 
monitoring, a node A senses by itself misbehavior of one of its neighbor node say, B 
through its monitor module. In recommendations and accusations, the node A receives 
perceptions regarding a presumed misbehavior of a node B from its neighboring 
nodes. This process can be done in two ways: (i) on-demand technique, and (ii) pro-
active technique. In case of on-demand technique, a node A willing to compute a node 
B’s reputation, broadcasts a reputation request to its (i.e., node A’s) neighbors, and 
waits for reputation replies. Upon receiving the replies, it combines them in the way 
discussed in Section 3.2.4. In case of proactive technique, if a node A detects any 
misbehavior of a node B, it broadcasts the corresponding information to its neighbors 
even when it did not receive any reputation request related to node B from its 
neighborhood. The proactive technique is more suitable for protecting networks as the 
misbehaving information is broadcast as soon as an intrusion is detected. However, it 
has a high communication overhead on the network. The on-demand technique, on the 
other hand, has less overhead of communication. However, its security scope is lim-
ited, as all the nodes in the network do not have relevant security information all the 
time. For gathering reputation information, the proposed mechanism uses both the 
proactive and the on-demand techniques depending on the situation. To be more spe-
cific, the reputation information is exchanged as follows: 
     Let’s first assume that two nodes A and B are present in a MANET and the node A 
detects that B is dropping packets. However, A will not broadcast this information to 
its neighbors unless B’s packet dropping rate crosses a pre-defined threshold value. 
Packet dropping by node B may be due to some physical problems of the node or 
because of its malicious behavior. Use of a threshold in monitoring packet loss en-
sures that the number of packets being dropped is high enough, and some new routes 
need to be computed regardless of the reason for the packet drop. 
    Let us now assume that a new node D has entered into the transmission range of 
node A. In this case, node A sends a reputation request about node B to the node D 
asking for its recommendations. The node A then combines the reputation reply that it 
receives from D with his own observation. This combined trust metric of the node B 
will reflect its final trust-worthiness. The method of computing the final reputation 
value is discussed in Section 3.2.4.  
3.2.2   Reputation information formatting 
The neighboring nodes in the MANET need to exchange the reputation information 
among each other. For exchanging reputation information, the proposed mechanism 
uses REP_MESS messages. A REP_MESS is an IP datagram with a reputation 
header inserted between the IP Header and the data payload. The reputation header 
consists of three fields: (i) REP_MESS_TYPE, (ii) NODE_ID, and (iii) REP_VAL. 
REP_MESS_TYPE are of three categories: (i) REP_REQUEST, (ii) 
REP_RESPONSE, and (iii) REP_BROADCAST.  The REP_REQUEST message 
type is used by a node when it requests for recommendations from its neighbors about 
a new node that is willing to join the network. The REP_RESPONSE message type is 
used by a node for replying to a recommendation request. For example, let us assume 
that a node A has already some reputation information regarding a node B. If node A 
receives a recommendation request regarding node B, it needs to generate a 
REP_MESS message with the REP_RESPONSE type and send it to the requester. The 
REP_BROADCAST message type is used when a node needs to broadcast some repu-
tation information. 
NODE_ID: it represents the IP address of the malicious node or the new node that 
is willing to join the network. 
REP_VAL: it is the reputation value that the node detecting the misbehavior has 
computed, and stored in its reputation table. 
3.2.3   Reputation information maintenance 
The reputation information is evaluated at each node before it is locally stored or 
broadcast to its neighbors. The method of evaluation of reputation is discussed in 
Section 3.2.4. 
     Each node maintains a reputation table for storing reputation information for each 
of its neighbors. The node gets this information by either direct monitoring or through 
broadcast message received from some of its neighboring nodes. The reputation table 
for a node is updated whenever there is any change in its reputation value. The reputa-
tion table has two fields: NODE_ID and REP_VAL. The significances of these fields 
have been discussed in Section 3.2.2.  
3.2.4   Reputation rating 
Reputation value for a node is a number that can take values between 0 and 1. At the 
bootstrapping phase of the system, every node has reputation value 1. The reputation 
value for a node decreases if it exhibits any misbehavior. The reputation computation 
is done by taking into account the ratio of the correctly forwarded packets to the total 
number of packets that a node should forward in a given time window.  The node A 
computes the reputation r(A, B) of node B using (1). 
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Let us now consider a MANET that consists of three nodes A, B, and C. Three dif-
ferent scenarios can be thought of as discussed below: 
1. Reputation computing during network establishment: in this case, the nodes A, B 
and C meet for the first time. Each node creates an entry for the other two and assigns 
them reputation value of 1 to start with. 
2. Combining previous and current reputation values: If node A detects misbehav-
ior of node B, it needs to combine the new reputation value of node B with its previ-
ously stored reputation value. The combined reputation value is computed using (2).  
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The factor a can take a value between 0 to 1. The value r(A,B) is a weighted sum of 
two components. The first part describes the node B’s reputation value already present 
in the node A’s reputation table. If node A have not met node B before, then the value 
rreptab(A,B) is set to 1 as mentioned earlier. The second part reflects contribution of 
node B’s new reputation value. As a node’s previous reputations are also considered, 
the evaluation will be more consistent and seamless. Indeed, a good node that might 
have met some physical problems for a short time will not be punished and discarded 
as its reputation will surely increase again if it is relied on for forwarding data packets. 
Moreover, a node’s reputation should seamlessly vary. If the reputation of a node 
fluctuates too fast, new routing paths will be frequently invoked, and the node’s power 
will be quickly exhausted. However, the most recent reputation values are given 
higher weights by assigning higher values to the factor α (say 0.8 for example) in (2). 
3. Computing reputation when exchanging reputation information within a 
neighborhood: According to the reputation collecting mechanism described in section 
3.2.1, two cases need to be discussed in this scenario: (i) proactive and (ii) on-
demand. These cases are presented below: 
(i) Proactive scenario: in this case, a node A broadcasts reputation information re-
garding a node B to its neighborhood, in particular node to C, as soon as node B’s 
misbehavior is detected. In this case, node C computes the reputation of node B using 
(3) as follows:  
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    According to (3), the reputation of node B as maintained in node C is a weighted 
sum taking into account the proper perception of node C regarding node B and the 
perception of the broadcaster. The term rbroad (A, B) is the reputation value of node B 
that the node A has broadcasted. The term rreptab(C, A) is the node A’s reputation value 
currently stored in node C’s reputation table. The new reputation value of the node B 
in the node C’s reputation table is computed based on the perception of the broadcast-
ing node A. The relative weights of these two perception components will depend on 
the trustworthiness of the node A. If the node A is trustful, the value of rbroad(A, B) is 
close to 1. 
(ii) On-demand scenario: let us assume in this case that the MANET has n number 
of nodes denoted as: A, N1, N2, …..Nn-1. Let us imagine now that a new node D wants 
to join the network. The node A detects the presence of node D, and broadcasts a 
reputation request for node D in its neighborhood. If the node A receives responses 
from p number of neighbors, then node A computes the reputation value of node D 
using (4) as follows:  
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In this case, the all responses from different neighbors of node A are not treated 
equally. Node A treats each response based on the current reputation value the sender 
as existing in the reputation table maintained in it. Higher the value of p, i.e., more the 
number of neighboring nodes of A participating in the reputation value computation of 
node D, more accurate will be the finally computed reputation value. In the worst 
case, p =1, i.e., only one node from the neighbors of node A sends the response. In this 
case, the computed reputation value of node D will be least reliable. In this case, (4) 
will be effectively reduced to (3) with a multiplying factor.  
4   Simulation 
To test the performance of our mechanism, the 802.11 MAC layer implemented in 
network simulator ns2 is used for simulation. The chosen parameters for simulation 
are presented in Table 1. Each node in the network is assumed to have a buffer with a 
capacity of 64 packets with FIFO interface queue. In the simulation, we have consid-
ered only the Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) protocol. However, our proposed trust 
model is applicable to any routing protocol for ad hoc networks. 
Malicious nodes are simulated using a two-phase Markov chain machine. While in 
the good phase, the nodes do not drop any packets, in the bad phase, packets are 
dropped by malicious nodes based on a function. This function generates a random 
number between a maximum value (MAX_RATE) and a minimum value 
(MIN_RATE). The Markov chain machine oscillates between both phases during a 
period of time (ttrans), which may be kept fixed or varied randomly. During the simula-
tion, ttrans is varied randomly between 100 sec to 200 sec. The traffic is simulated in 
the network by allowing 5 nodes to generate packets at the rate of 4 packets per sec. 
Table 1. Simulation Parameters 
 Parameters Values 
Simulation duration 
Simulation area 
Number of mobile nodes 
Transmission range 
Movement model 
Maximum speed 
Traffic type 
Number of malicious nodes 
Host pause time 
Max packet dropping rate 
Min. packet dropping rate 
450 seconds 
1000 m * 500 m 
22 
250 m 
Random waypoint 
10 m/sec 
CBR (UDP) 
5 
300 sec 
8 packets/sec 
1 packet/sec 
 
Fig. 2 shows the packet-dropping pattern by a malicious node over entire period of 
simulation. The good phase of the node is during the interval 140-200 sec and 400-
450 sec. On the other hand, during the intervals 0-140 sec and 240-400 sec, the node 
is in the bad phase and drops packets varying from 5 to 30. Fig. 3 depicts the per-
formance of the protocol in computing the reputation of a malicious node as per-
formed by one of its neighbors. Here, both the nodes are on the routing path between 
the source and the destination. It is noted that the reputation value decreases from 1 to 
0.25 in the first 140 sec, when the malicious node is in its bad phase as seen in Fig. 2. 
For the next 100 sec (140-240), the reputation of the node increases because the node 
is in its good phase. The reason for the slow rate of growth of reputation during the 
good phase of the node may be attributed to the packet loss due to temporary interfer-
ence of the channel disturbance. 
      
 
       Fig. 2.  Packet dropping by a malicious node         Fig. 3.  Reputation of a malicious node 
To study the performance of the protocol in a more realistic scenario, the value of 
ttrans is varied between 0 and 5 sec. Two different situations were investigated: the 
reputation variation of a node in a low packet dropping scenario (Fig. 4), where 
MAX_RATE and MIN_RATE are 5 and 0 packets respectively, and the reputation 
variation in presence of a high dropping configuration (Fig. 5), where MAX_RATE 
and MIN_RATE are 15 and 3 packets respectively. The reputation value oscillates 
between 0.58 and 0.78 in Fig. 4. This is because some packets are forwarded to desti-
nation; but some others are dropped during the bad phase. 
  
 
Fig. 4.  Reputation  in low packet drop rate     Fig. 5.  Reputation in high packet drop rate  
 
 
        Fig. 6.  Reputation of a non-malicious node        Fig. 7.  Reputation of an accused  node   
Fig. 6 represents the pattern of variation of the reputation of a non-malicious node. 
It is observed that the highest and the lowest reputation value of the node are 0.98 and 
0.85 respectively, which are quite reasonable values under the experimental setup. 
Finally, Fig. 7 illustrates the reputation variation of an accused node (say, Y) as com-
puted by another node (say, X). Node X updates the reputation of Y by taking into 
account the trustworthiness of the broadcaster, and the previous reputation value of Y . 
As can be seen in Fig. 7, the reputation of Y started falling from its initial value of 0.7 
after accusations were received.   
5   Conclusion 
In this paper, we have proposed a scheme that enables routing protocols in MANETs 
to detect malicious packet dropping by any node in the network. In the proposed 
scheme, each node in the network independently monitors the behavior of its 
neighbors and computes the reputation value for each of its neighboring nodes. Based 
on the reputation value of a node, its trustworthiness is determined. If the reputation of 
a node falls below a threshold value, it is no longer considered trustworthy by its 
neighbors and is identified as a malicious node. The results of simulation on the 
scheme show that it is quite effective in identifying malicious nodes in a MANET. 
Designing an efficient routing algorithm on top of this selfish node detection algo-
rithm constitute a future work.   
References 
1.  Eschenauer, L., Gligor, V.D.: A Key-Management Scheme for Distributed Sensor Networks. 
In: Proceedings of ACM Conference on Computer and Communication Security, (2002). 
2. Buttyan, L., Hubaux, J.P.: Report on A Working Session on Security in Wireless Ad-Hoc 
Networks. Mobile Computing and Communications Review, Volume 6 (2002). 
3. Jsang, A.: An Algebra for Assessing Trust in Certification Chains. In: Proceedings of the 
Network and Distributed Systems Security Symposium, (1999). 
4. Manchala, D.W.: Trust Metrics, Models, and Protocols for Electronic Commerce Transac-
tions. In: Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Sys-
tems, pp. 312-321 (1998). 
5.  Kamvar, S.D., Schlosser, M.T., Garcia-Molina, H.: The Eigentrust Algorithm for Reputation 
     Management in P2P Networks. In:  Proceedings of the International World Wide Web      
     Conferences, (2003). 
6.  Bucheggar, S., Boudec, J.Y.: Performance analysis of the CONFIDANT  Protocol: Coop-
eration of Nodes-Fairness in Dynamic Ad Hoc NeTworks. In: Proceedings of the 3rd Sym-
posium on Mobile Ad-Hoc Networking and Computing, pp. 226-236 (2000). 
7. Azzedin, F. and Maheswaran, M.: Evolving and Managing Trust in Grid Computing Sys-
tems. In: Proceedings of the IEEE Canadian Conference on Electrical and Computer Engi-
neering (2002). 
8. Stajano, F., and Anderson, R.: The Resurrecting Ducking: Security Issues for Ad Hoc Wire-
less Networks. In: Proceedings of the 7th International Workshop on Security Protocols. 
LNCS 1796, Springer-Verlag (1999). 
9. Eshenauer, L., Gligor, V.D., and Barras, J.: On Trust Establishment in Mobile Ad Hoc Net-
works. In: Proceedings of the Security Protocols Workshop, Cambridge (2002). 
10.Repantis, T. and Kalogeraki, V.: Decentralized Trust Management for Ad Hoc Peer-to-Peer 
Networks. International Journal of Wireless Information Networks (2006). 
11.Patwardhan, A., Perich, F., Joshi, A., Finn, T., and Yesha, Y.: Querying in Packs: Trustwor-
thy Data Management in Ad Hoc Networks. International Journal of Wireless Information 
Networks (2006). 
12.Sun, Y.L., Han, Z., Yu, W., Ray Liu, K.J.: A Trust Evaluation Framework in Distributed 
Frameworks: Vulnerability Analysis and Defense against Attacks. In: Proceedings of IEEE 
INFOCOM, pp. 23-29 (2006). 
13.Chang, B-J., Kuo, S-L, Liang, Y-H, and Wang, D-Y.: Markov Chain-Based Trust Model for 
Analyzing Trust Value in Distributed Multicasting Mobile Ad Hoc Networks. In: Proceed-
ings of the IEEE Asia-Pacific Services Computing Conference, pp. 156-161 (2008). 
14.Sen, J., Chowdhury, P.R., Sengupta, I.: A Distributed Trust Establishment Scheme for 
Mobile Ad Hoc Networks. In: Proceedings of the International Conference on Computing: 
Theory and Applications, pp. 51-58 (2007). 
15.Sen, J., Ukil, A., Bera, D., Pal, A.: A Distributed Intrusion Detection System for Wireless 
Ad Hoc Networks. In: Proceedings of the 16th IEEE International Conference on Network-
ing (ICON), pp. 1-6 (2008). 
